The Morally Obvious :: Ethics Philosophy Moral Papers

The virtuously ObviousI. Obviousness. There is no way to contrive an ethical surmise which does not rely in the end upon moral judgments that are subjectively nonrational or obvious or unsloped seen. No military issue which of the major approaches to ethical theory one takes, an supreme reliance upon the individuals intuitive judgment is inevitable. If one supposes that moral valuations are sui generis, irreducible, the deliverances of a moral horse sense or faculty, then manifestly what one hardly feels or just sees to be morally valuable will have to be the nett court of appeal. If one supposes that moral values are a peculiar(prenominal) subclass of human likings or preferences, say those things men want overall, in the big run, in the light of mans deepest needs and his sympathetic nature, etc., why then those wants and preferences mustiness themselves be finally know by making their heraldic bearing felt. The presence of a want, of a satisfaction or fulfillment, of p leasure or pain, is cognise intuitively and immediately. Finally, if moral values are perceived by the spunk of reason, as a number of philosophers still urge, so that the wrongness of things is known by the mind in a way similar to its well-educated 2 + 2 = 4, this too must be seen as an ultimate reliance upon the intellectually obvious, or the intuitively known.It appears that whether in morality or in any field of human opinion we poop ask for exculpations only so far. Even when a successful acknowledgment of an opinion net be given, the very success of that justification involves the just seeing of how the justification applies to and supports the opinion. Beyond that, we can always request a proof of the justifying premises or considerations themselves, and if we keep asking for a justification for the justification that has just been given, we will soon reach a localise where all that can be said is that the thing just seems obvious, and we can only hope that others wi ll think so too. Notoriously, of course, others often dont.I have said that moral judgments must in the end sculptural relief upon an intuitive judgment of some sort. The word intuition is too utile and too close to what I mean to avoid, but it also has skillful connotations I wish to disavow. Philosophers often use intuition to mean a way of knowing involving no inference whatever and yielding needful and incorrigible results.