Spinozas Philosophical Psychotherapy :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Spinozas philosophic Psychotherapymissing works citedABSTRACT Spinozas doctrine has a matter-of-fact aim. The morality can be interpreted as a scarper to a happy, intellectually easy life. Spinoza gives us principles about how to caution against the power of passions which prevent the thought from attaining understanding. In what follows, I consider Spinozas techniques for guarding against the passions by tour to Jonathan Bennetts criticisms of Spinozistic psychotherapy. Bennett finds three profound techniques for freeing oneself from the passions (i) reflecting on determinism (ii) separating and joining and (iii) turning passions into actions. Bennett believes that all of these techniques are in some sense flawed. I indicate that Bennett offers good criticism against technique (i), and his criticisms against (ii) and (iii) are unfounded. I. IntroductionSpinozas philosophy had a practical aim. What he destinyed to do was to show the means to perfect peace of mind and joy offered by the life of reason. The Ethics is written as a guidebook to a happy, intellectually flourishing life. Basic in Spinozas thought is the simple observation that we all want to live well but do not know the counseling to a happy life. He wanted to give us the book of instructions which include principles about how to guard us from the power of passions which prevent the mind from understanding. In this paper my aim is to consider how well founded Spinozas techniques against the passions are. I ordain do this by concentrating on Jonathan Bennetts criticism of Spinozistic psychotherapy. Bennett finds from the Ethics three central techniques of freeing oneself from passions (i) reflecting on determinism (ii) separating and joining and (iii) turning passions into actions. Bennett believes that all these techniques are in some sense flawed. My contention is that Bennett offers good criticism against reflecting on determinism-technique but that his criticism against separating and joining-technique as well as against turning passions into actions-technique is not well-founded. The paper devotes roughly space to the turning passions into actions-technique. However, before considering Bennetts view of Spinozas psychotherapy, I will give an overview of Spinozas speculation of activity and passivity. II. Passivity and ActivityAccording to Spinoza we act, when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the seemly cause. . . . we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause. (IIID2). The notion of adequate cause that occurs in the definition above is defined as follows